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ABSTRACT
Prior to 1987, the U.S. was the major supplier of ground,
air, and naval weapons, and other military equipment to Thailand.
Since 1987, Thailand has turned to the PRC for the purchase of
weapons and equipment required for many of its armed forces'
modernization and force restructuring programs. In addition to
the acquisition of large quantities of ground forces equipment
for the Royal Thai Army (RTA), Thailand has also investigated the
acquisition of PRC fighter aircraft for the Royal Thai Air Force
(RTAF) and is in the process of acquiring six frigates for the
Royal Thai Navy (RTN) from the PRC. What are the factors which
have caused Thailand to enhance its political-military relations
with the PRC and purchase significant amounts of military
equipment from the PRC in a relatively short period of time
(1987-present)?
The objective of this thesis will be to examine the improved
and improving Sino-Thai military relationship and analyze the
key variables responsible for changing Thai political and
military attitudes towards the PRC. The thesis also e-.amines
Thai willingness to actively pursue supplier diversification
strategies with respect to major arms acquisition contracts.
Finally, the thesis will also consider the impact of the Sino-
Thai military relationship on current and short term U.S. policy
objectives in Thailand. Appendix A provides a timeline of
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I. INTRODUCTION
"In international relations, there can be no eternal
friends, nor can there be eternal enemies. The only thing
eternal is the national interest." Lord Palmerston
In contrast to the decades of the 1950's and 1960's which
were characterized by hostile Sino-Thai relations, the 1970's
marked the beginning of a period of reconciliation. This later
period was highlighted by the extraction of U.S. forces from
South Vietnam and Thailand, the establishment of Thai and U.S.
diplomatic relations with the Chinese, and the invasion of
Cambodia by Vietnam.
Since 1979, the Chinese and Thais have expanded military,
diplomatic and economic relations through high level state to
state contacts and the acquisition of Chinese military arms and
equipment. Thai-U.S. political and military relations have
remained strong and multilateral security agreements such as the
Manila Pact of 1954 and the bilateral Rusk-Thanat Agreement of
1962 have never been repudiated by the U.S. or Thailand. The
U.S. continues to provide sophisticated military equipment to the
Thais although the percentage of equipment supplied by the U.S.
the Chinese has declined within the last 3 to 4 years in favor of
increasing acquisition of Chinese equipment by the Thai military.
(See Appendix B)
From the first Chinese "gift" of arms to Thailand in 1985,
to the most recent orders for significant numbers of main battle
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tanks (MBT) armored personnel carriers (APC), and Jianghu-class
and Type 25 frigates, Sino-Thai military relations have been
mutually beneficial for the Thais, the Chinese, and, to some
extent for the U.S. Although there are certain mid-to-long term
disadvantages to more direct Chinese involvement in Thailand, the
offsetting influence of the PRC visa vis Vietnam and the Soviet
Union in Indochina has created a situation where some current
Chinese and U.S. policy goals in this region seem to overlap.
For the Thais, the decline of the internal insurgency threat
of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), the occupation of
Kampuchea and Laos by Vietnamese military forces and incursions
into and shellings of Thai territory by Vietnamese and Laotian
forces dictated the necessity for a shift in the orientation of
Thailand's military doctrine from counterinsurgency to
conventional warfare.
More than anything, two particularly embarrassing and costly
military operations were mitigating events supporting arguments
by the Thai armed forces for the creation of a more capable,
responsive, and better equipped conventional force, post haste.
The first was against the Vietnamese at the Chong Bok Pass in
February 1987 and the second against Laotian forces at Ban
Ramklao from December 1987 through February 1988. (See
Apprndix C) In both these operations, the Thai military
discovered their lack of conventional mobility and modern heavy
weapons a distinct disadvantage when dealing with the Vienamese
or Vietnamese-trained forces.
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Since 1987, technologically advanced military equipment from
the U.S. and other Western nations as well as armor, anti-
aircraft weapons, and artillery from the PRC, has contributed to
the rapid modernization of the Thai Armed Forces. The planned
modernization program is scheduled to eventually include
mechanization of five infantry divisions, the creation of light
infantry and helicopter-borne calvary units, an enhancement of
naval surface and possibly subsurface warfare capabilities, the
expansion of the the Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) from two
regiments to a division, and the possible addition of multi-role
aircraft squadrons by the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF). [Ref. 1]
The low price and easy payment terms for PRC weapons and
equipment, the recognition of the PRC as the strongest regional
counterweight to Soviet/Vietnamese influence, the desire to
diversify sources of arms acquisitions, and a decreasing trend in
U.S. security assistance, have caused Thailand to significantly
increase its military purchases from the PRC, rivaling the U.S.
quantitatively as a major military supplier of the Thai Armed
Forces.
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II. SINO-THAI RELATIONS (1950-1979)
A. BUILDING SUSPICION AND HOSTILITY (1949-1969)
Although the military and political relationship between
Thailand and the PRC today can be classified as "close and
growing closer", this was certainly not the case during the
period of 1949-1969. In 1949, the establishment of Communist
China and the resulting specter of expanding communist power in
Southeast Asia swayed Thailand from a postwar neutralism to a
pro-Western course in regional affairs.
1. U.S.-Thai Relations Mature
In 1950, relations between the United States and Thailand
were substantially improved after the U.S. persuaded the Thai
government to recognize the Bao Dai government in Southern
Vietnam. In return, the U.S. provided Thailand with grants for
military, education, health, and agricultural development
assistance. The majority of these grants were provided under
U.S.-Thai agreements for economic and technical cooperation and
for military assistance.
"Although the American government had, since V-J Day,
followed a policy of diplomatic support for Thailand as the only
country in Southeast Asia that had escapeJ colonization,
relations between Rangkok and Washington now assumed the
character of an entente cordiale." [Ref. 2] Between 1950 and
1957, U.S. asistance to Thailand amounted to $138 million [Ref. 3].
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In 1950 Thailand also supported the U.N war effort in
Korea by sending 4,000 troops. In December of 1951, the U.S. and
Thailand exchanged notes which essentially provided Thailand with
an assurance that it would receive military assistance according
to the Mutual Security Act of 1951. [Ref. 4] In further support
of Western and U.S. policies in Southeast Asia, Thailand
condemned the Viet Minh invasions of Laos and Cambodia.
In April 1953, Thailand participated with the U.S.,
Burma, and Taiwan in the establishment of a Joint Military
Committee to consider ways of evacuating Kuomingtang (KMT) forces
from Burma to Taiwan. Although Burma withdrew from the
committee, Thailand, the U.S., and Taiwan reached an
accommodation and evacuation of KMT forces via Thailand began on
November 7, 1953. Between this time and when the operation ended
in September 1954, almost 7,000 "foreign forces" and dependents
had been moved from Burma to Taiwan. [Ref. 5]
The successes of the Viet Minh in Indochina in 1953 and
early 1954, the defeat of the French at Dienbienphu in April
1954, and the possibility of Communist-dominated regimes in
Cambodia and Laos made the Thai government receptive to the
efforts of the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,
to bolster the region's military security by organizing the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954. In addition,
American military and economic aid to Thailand was increased.
[Ref. 6]
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Throughout the early 1950's, Thailand once again departed
from its desired foreign policy objective of "dealing with all
parties" in regional affairs by reluctantly moving into the
Western camp and towards a reliance on the U.S. for security from
the internal and external threat of regional communism. Without
the U.S., Thailand feared Eisenhower's "domino theory" arguments
would become a reality. For Thailand, improving relations with
the U.S. brought it economic aid, an enhanced feeling of national
security, and the capability to carry forward modernization of
its military forces.
2. The Bandung Spirit
The years 1949-1969 were also marked by Thailand's
refusal to recognize Communist China, bitter disagreements over
the status of ethnic Chinese in Thailand, the deployment of Thai
military forces to Korea in 1950, Chinese support to Viet Minh
forces in Laos and Vietnam, the formation of an autonomous Thai
state in Yunnan (China), propaganda radio broadcasts, and public
signs of support for Thai exiles in Beijing. The formation of
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954 exacerbated
diplomatic conflict and precluded the establishment of Thai-PRC
relations.
The April 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung,
Indonesia was attended by twenty-nine countries including those
of Communist, uncommitted, and pro-Western orientation. The
conference provided the opportunity for a Sino-Thai dialog
between Thai Prince Wan and the PRC's Chou En Lai. In cordial
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discussions, Chou assured Prince Wan that the PRC would not
perpetrate aggressive action against Thailand, would respect Thai
sovereignty, and that the autonomous Thai state which had been
established in Yunnan Province was not done so with the objective
of fostering subversion of Thai dissident elements in the
northeast region of Thailand.
Subsequently, there was some easing of tensions between
1955 and 1959 as trade between the two countries increased and
restrictions on Chinese nationals in Thailand were relaxed. The
honeymoon was short-lived. Recognition of Communist China by
Cambodia in July 1958 and the October Sarit Coup in Thailand
"marked a phasing out of the Bandung spirit of accommodation
which had marked Chinese-Thai relations. [Ref. 7] Sino-Thai
relations would now be polarized by two major issues: Chinese
ideological and materiel support to the communist insurgency in
Thailand and Thai relations with the United States.
3. The PRC and the CPT
The first and foremost irritant to Sino-Thai relations
was China's support for the communist insurgency in Thailand.
After having achieved control of the government in 1949, the
Chinese communists embarked on a foreign policy of confrontation
with regional states which included support to regional
insurgency movements, an invasion of Tibet, and a threatened
invasion of Taiwan. This confrontational stance continued into
the mid-1950's in its support for North Korea against U.N. forces
and for the Viet Minh against the French in Indochina. PRC
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support to regional insurgencies also included assistance to
those in Burma, Malaysia, and Thailand.
While active in these regional communist activities, the
PRC was domestically experiencing political and social turmoil.
In the shadow of Khrushchev's attack on Stalin and the Hungarian
Revolt of 1956, Mao decided to experiment with free expression
and instituted the "Hundred Flowers Movement" in May 1957.
Lasting only one month, it was quickly suppressed in the face of
stinging criticism of almost every aspect of the Communist
government.
In 1958, another socio-economic experiment was begun
which sought to place the entire Chinese rural population into
communes. By the end of 1958, virtually all of the PRC's 700,000
collective farms had been merged into 26,000 huge communes and a
radically new form of organization harshly imposed on the PRC's
rural population. [Ref. 8]
China's "Great Leap Forward" (GLF) was also instituted in
1958 to push forward economic progress through agricultural and
industrial development. Although some success was experienced in
the early months of the GLF, it faltered in 1959 and collapsed
altogether in 1960-1961. Much of the blame for failure of this
economic experiment belonged to poor planning and implementation
on the part of the Chinese. Mao blamed the Soviets for its
failure because they had withdrawn their advisers and technicians
in August of 1960. The resulting ill-will between the Soviet
Union and the PRC led to the Sino-Soviet split of 1960.
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"The fiasco of the GLF collapse, resultant famine, and
stymied economic development over the next several years ended
any remaining possibility that Mao could bid for leadership of
the socialist bloc. Although he lost much of his domestic power,
he continued to dictate PRC foreign policy." [Ref. 9]
Domestic economic and political problems hampered but did
not prevent the PRC from continuing to support regional communist
insurgencies. In response to improving U.S.-Thai relations and
the increasing presence of U.S. military forces in Thailand, the
PRC increased its support to the Communist Party of Thailand.
Prior to the actual outbreak of widespread armed
insurgent activity, the Thais had been aware of the extra-legal
activities of the PRC. Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman
characterized the PRC's insurgent support activities as:
...ant-like, mostly clandestine, and ...surreptitious.
Instead of seeking publicity and spectacular result, they
laboriously and patiently aim at gradually undermining and
gnawing at the existing strength and structure. They seem to
think that time is on their side and in due course the fruit
may be ripe for picking [Ref. 10].
After the outbreak of armed conflict in 1965, insurgent
operations were greatly assisted by the provision of Chinese
ideological support through Thai language propaganda broadcasts
from the Voice of the People of Thailand, Radio Peking, and Radio
Hanoi, and material support from the PRC and North Vietnam in the
form of arms, ammunition, and training. The primary reason cited
by the communists for the transition to armed struggle was the
U.S. military build-up in Thailand which commenced in 1964 to
support U.S. military operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
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Considered the number one threat to Thai internal
security through 1979, the communist insurgency spread in scope
from the northeast to the northern, central and southern (Malay
border) areas of the country. From 1965-1969, units from all
branches of the Thai armed forces, police and other paramilitary
units as well as various civic organizations were employed in an
attempt to curtail the rapid spread of the communist insurgency.
Although the PRC was willing to provide material and
ideological support to this and various other regional insurgent
movements, there was never any guarantee and little evidence that
this support was successful. Neither the training of cadres,
technical and tactical advice, nor logistical support was able to
provide the majority of these movements with the military nor
organizational capability to garner sufficient popular support
necessary to defeat the national government forces. Of course,
any PRC interest in the insurgents widened the gap between the
PRC and the government of Thailand.
4. The Buildup of U.S. Forces in Thailand
The second major obstacle to Sino-Thai relations was the
consolidation of U.S.-Thai diplomatic relations and the build-up
of U.S. forces in Thailand. The basis for U.S. support to
Thailand was contained in the provisions of the 1954 Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact) which called for the
U.S. to respond to external aggression against treaty members,
including Thailand, not in a reflexive manner characteristic of
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the NATO agreements but, by acting, "...to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional processes." (See Appendix D)
After signing of the Manila Pact, U.S. military
assistance to Thailand expanded significantly between 1954 and
1967. Prior to 1960, U.S. military aid to Thailand was
principally in the form of improved communications and transport
facilities. [Ref. 11]. After conclusion of the 1960 Military
Assistance Agreement and the Laos Crisis of 1962, substantial
contributions of American military hardware to Thailand began
[Ref. 12].
The objective of providing U.S. military assistance was
to strengthen Thailand's military capability through buildup and
modernization of its equipment, improvement of its operational
tactics, and increased training for its personnel against both
external and internal threats [Ref. 13].
The 1962 Rusk-Thanat Communique clarified U.S. intentions
with respect to the Manila Pact and assured Thailand that the
U.S. would react unilaterally, but not in a reflexiv manner, in
response to an external threat to Thailand [Ref. 14]. (See
Appendix E) The 1962 agreement was supplemented by a "military
contingency plan" drawn up in 1965. "This plan called for a
lightning attack across Savannakhet, Laos, into Vietnam's Khe
Sanh Valley and along Highway 9, which runs east through Quang
Tri Province until it intersects Vietnam's major north-south
artery, Highway 1 near the coast. Such an offensive, if
successful, would have cut Vietnam in two just south of the
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former demilitarized zone, which straddled the Ben Hai River.
[Ref. 15]
It has been suggested that this plan was in exchange for
American use of Thai military bases which in 1965 included Don
Muang, Korat, Nakhom Phanom, Takhli, Ubon, and Udorn. U Tapao
was added in 1967. [Ref. 16]
The signing of a series of bilateral and multilateral
security treaties by the U.S. with the developing nations of the
region served to contain Chinese communist expansion by
encircling the PRC's southeastern and southern rim with
independent and stable "democratic" nations whose internal
dynamics it was hoped would provide a hostile and infertile
social, economic, and political atmosphere for successful
communist subversion.
In support of U.S. policies and actions to contain the
spread of Chinese communism in Indochina, Thailand agreed to the
basing of U.S. forces in Thailand in 1964 and committed ground,
air, and naval forces to Vietnam from 1964 through 1969. "By
1969, there were over 50,000 U.S. military personnel in Thailand,
with nearly 600 aircraft. [Ref. 17] During the Vietnam Conflict,
Utapao as a particularly critical airbase, capable of handling
all U.S. military aircraft including the B-52's, the U-2
intelligence aircraft, and larger transport aircraft.
Thailand also served as a base of CIA operations involved
in gathering intelligence on communist forces in Indochina as
well as on the insurgent elements in Thailand. U.S. Special Forces
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troops trained Thai police and soldiers in low intensity conflict
methods as well as training Cambodian soldiers for special
missions, and training Lao elite troops and Thai 'volunteers' to
fight in Laos. [Ref. 18]
By 1969, more than 12,000 Thai troops were committed to
Vietnam representing close to 14% of the Royal Thai Army's
strength [Ref. 19]. Thailand was also conducting U.S.-
coordinated military operations in Laos and Cambodia, including
reconnaissance and air support operations, which were perceived
by the PRC as directly supportive of U.S. operations in Vietnam.
5. Summary
Between 1950 and 1969, Sino-Thai relations were affected
by both internal and regional influences. While Bandung talks
between the Thais and Chinese in 1955 were hopeful, increasing
Chinese support for communist activities in Thailand was seen by
the Thais as contradictory to Mao's "Five Principles of
Coexistence" adopted by conference members, particularly the two
principles of nonaggression and noninterference in the internal
affairs of other nations.
As the internal communist insurgency gained strength and
communist movements in Laos and Cambodia threatened Thailand's
north and eastern borders, Thailand found it to be in its
national interest to support U.S. military efforts in Indochina.
The increasing military cooperation between the U.S. and Thailand
with respect to operations in Vietnam, Thailand's diplomatic
support for Taiwan and its refusal to recognize the PRC or
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support its admission to the UN, and the formation of two
western-aligned International Governmental Organizations (IGO);
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), exacerbated
Sino/Thai relations. For the most part, "it can be argued that
the hostility the PRC displayed towards Southeast Asia between
1954 and the late sixties reflected its indignation at, and
opposition to, the intrusion of a hostile outside power, namely
the United States, into what it considered to be essentially its
sphere of influence, rather than any deep-rooted enmity the PRC
harbored towards Southeast Asia itself." [Ref. 20]
B. AN EVOLVING PERSPECTIVE OF THREAT (1969-1979)
1. Tet and the U.S. Role Redefined
In 1968 Malaysia's Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin, musing
over British plans to withdraw its military forces from Southeast
Asia and concede to the geopolitical and military reality of the
diminuation of its influence "East of the Suez", remarked that
"The British won't die for Southeast Asia, but the Americans
will." It was not a particularly appropriate statement for two
reasons. First, many British soldiers had "died for Southeast
Asia" during British operations in the region during the Second
World War and during the 1948-1960 Malayan insurgency. Secondly,
American soldiers and airmen had been dying in the jungles, in
the hills, and in the villages of South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia since 1965. It also ignored growing American
disenchantment with the conflict following the Tet Offensive.
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On January 31, 1968, just eight days after the seizure of
the USS Pueblo by the North Koreans, the North Vietnamese and the
Vietcong launched the Tet Offensive. Inspite of initial enemy
successes, by late summer of 1968, the overall outcome of the
action was clearly a victory for the U.S. and South Vietnamese
military forces. But to many Americans, this major victory on
the battlefield did little to bolster their sense of looming
defeat in the overall sense of the Vietnam effort. As Frances
Fitzgerald observed in her book, A Fire in the Lake,
The Tet offensive had an electric effect on popular opinion
in the United States. The banner headlines and the television
reports of fighting in the cities brought the shock of reality
to what was still for many Americans a distant and
incomprehensible war. The picture of corpses in the garden of
the American Embassy cut through the haze of argument and
counterargument, giving flat contradiction to the official
optimism about the slow but steady progress of the war. Those
who had long held doubts and reservations now felt their doubts
confirmed. For the first time the major news magazines, Time,
Life, and Newsweek, began to criticize the war policy overtly;
television commentators such as Walter Cronkite, who had always
backed the administration, now questioned whether or not the
war could be won. [Ref. 21]
By 1969, a weary and angry domestic constituency, as well
as many in Government office, were ready to concede that the toll
in lives, the ravaging of Indochina, and devastation to the moral
fabric of this country had more than exceeded social and
politically acceptable limits. Opinion polls concerning the
President's handling of the war plummeted and many Congressmen,
formerly supportive of U.S. involvement, registered their
disillusionment with administration actions. "After years of
frantic bailing and pumping and damming and blasting, Washington
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was at last preparing to give the subcontinent a chance to find
its own level." [Ref. 22]
2. The Nixon Doctrine
In 1969, the announcement of a fundamental change in U.S.
policy towards Asia required Thailand to re-evaluate its
relations with the PRC. In a press conference in the Officers
Club on Guam on 25 July 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon,
informally announced his policy of Vietnamization and informally
outlined his thoughts on the necessity for a shift in U.S. policy
toward Southeast Asia. (See Appendix E) His comments were
formalized into what became know as the Nixon Doctrine during his
television and radio address entitled "The Pursuit of Peace in
Vietnam" on 3 November 1969. (See Appendix G)
To Asian and Pacific allies, the U.S. specifically
intended the Nixon Doctrine to imply that the U.S. would proceed
with announced Vietnamization in South Vietnam; that the U.S.
would continue to offer allies the protection of the "nuclear
umbrella"; that the U.S. would honor existing defense and other
commitments; and, that there would follow a significant
withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Pacific area, with the U.S.
seeking a new role as partner in the region. Perhaps the most
crucial element of the Doctrine was that U.S. military aid and
assistance would be available to our allies in the event of
external conventional or subversive threats provided it was
specifically requested, that the requesting nation was
aggressively involved in exerting a defensive effort on its own
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behalf, and that it was in the national interest of the U.S. to
respond.
Thailand was specifically informed by the United States
that it's new Indochina policies included a withdrawal of forces
from the region "without the undertaking of any new obligations"
and the intention of the U.S. to establish diplomatic relations
with the PRC [Ref. 23]. In addition to Vietnam, U.S. force
withdrawals were projected for Korea, Thailand, Japan, and the
Philippines. Reversion of Okinawa to Japan was also anticipated.
It was made clear that Thailand and other Southeast Asian
allies would have to assume an increased responsibility for their
own defense. "In September of 1969, the U.S. Senate passed a
resolution which, in effect, superseded the 1962 Rusk-Thanat
understandings and insisted that no American ground forces would
be employed in the event of war in Thailand." [Ref. 24] The U.S.
did reassure Thailand that its economic and security assistance
agreements would remain in force. In response to these actions,
Thailand announced plans to pull its forces out of Vietnam and
talks were initiated to remove all U.S. forces from Thailand.
Globally, the Nixon Doctrine sought to achieve the
following objectives before the 1972 elections:
(1) Make progress on the Berlin-Four Power tangle as the
necessary precondition to the Bonn-Moscow treaty detente;
(2) Arrive at some diminuation in defense expenditures through
strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviets;
(3) Maintain the truce, if no more, in the Middle East so as
to open the Suez Canal;
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(4) Negotiate, if possible, with the North Vietnamese while
nonetheless withdrawing American power from South Vietnam,
leaving the latter to determine its own future, but supported by
some residual American military aid;
(5) Cut baLk on military support in Korea, Japan, the
Philippines and Thailand; and,
(6) Limit, in an as yet unclear way, our defense of an old
ally, Taipei, in order to promote "peace" with a longstanding
enemy, Peking [Ref. 25].
3. Thailand Evaluates the New U.S. Role
For Thailand, the events of 1968-69, particularly the
promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine, had the effect of raising
serious doubts concerning the validity of existing treaty
commitments with the United States. Although the Thai's did not
feel that the United States was ready to abrogate existing
security agreements, there was some question as to whether these
security commitments (the Manila Pact and the Rusk-Thanat
Communique) and other political-security interests in the region
would retain their value to the U.S. in light of changing U.S.
foreign policy priorities and national interests. To Southeast
Asian allies the Nixon Doctrine was flawed in its failure to
provide a tangible criteria for intervention, its key points
being vague and allowing the U.S. too much leeway regarding a
response to a regional crisis.
The provisions of Article IV of the Manila Pact required
applicable parties to "...meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes." There was no requirement for
a reflexive response of any kind on the part of any signator. As
the U.S. reformulated its Asian policies, the Thais became more
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aware that the "constitutional processes" clause of the treaty
provided the U.S. a convenient escape device in case the
discharge of the treaty obligation did not appear to serve U.S.
national interests. Regarding this, [former] Thai Foreign
Minister Thanat Khoman remarked:
The question which arises then is: Will the help (to
the threatened nation) come? To ask the question does not
imply an intention to reflect on the moral integrity of one's
allies and partners; it is rather an expression of realism and
prudence. History, particularly of recent times, is strewn
with examples of lesser nations being sacrificed by their
allies on the pretext of preserving peace of the world but
actually because the national prestige and vital interests of
those allies were not directly affected. [Ref. 26]
The dependability of the U.S. to respond to future
regional security needs was also perceived by the Thai's as
weakened by the increasing assertiveness of the U.S. Congress
reflected in the War Powers Act of 1973, and the willingness of
U.S. domestic opinion to permit an atrophy of U.S. regional
interests. Thanat Khoman observed:
...Perhaps some day the U.S. Congress will realize that
its efforts to score a domestic and political victory over
the Administration with respect to the Vietnamese War did not
enhance America's international stature or credibility. If
anything, the April capitulation of Phnom Penh and Saigon, by
dealing a heavy blow to the U.S. position in the whole of Asia,
raised doubts about how effectively it will play its future
role as a responsible regional power. [Ref. 27)
The Nixon Doctrine had a positive effect in accelerating
the commencement of more cordial relations between Thailand and
the PRC. In 1969, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman
recommended that Thailand move away from its binding ties with
the U.S. and seek to improve its own relations with the PRC and
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North Vietnam. In 1971, Thailand announced its support for
Chinese admission to the U.N.; having voted against such a move
in 1966, 1968, and 1969. [Ref. 281
4. Bangkok Seeks a New Foreign Policy
Although Thanat Khoman was ousted in a coup in 1971, the
move toward Sino-Thai reconciliation remained on track. After
the re-election of Nixon and the signing of the Paris Peace
Accords, Thailand opened normal trade with the PRC in 1974. In
March of 1975, Thai Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj outlined his
government's foreign policy which included equidistant relations
with the superpowers, normalization of relations with the PRC,
withdrawal of foreign troops from Thailand, constructive contacts
with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and continued
cooperation with ASEAN. [Ref. 29] Following this statement,
diplomatic relations were established with the PRC on 1 July 1975
and the U.S. completed withdrawal of its forces from Thailand in
March 1976. Although beneficial for Thai internal interests, the
removal of U.S. forces from Thailand was done without obtaining
any quid pro quo from regional communist adversaries presaging
the requirement for the development of a military relationship with
the PRC as a hedge against Vietnamese expansionism. Once again,
Thailand was forced to "lean away" from its stated goal of
achieving a unique omnidirectional foreign policy.
The failure of the U.S. effort in Indochina was the most
significant factor responsible for the reorientation of Thai
foreign policies that had previously supported non-recognition
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and containment of the PRC. Key events that caused Thailand to
question the reliability and dependability of the U.S. to honor
existing arrangements under the Manila Pact and the Rusk-Thanat
Communique and to seek a more autonomous foreign policy free of
U.S. influence included: promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine; U S.
normalization of relations with the PRC in 1972; the Paris Peace
Talks; the pullout of U.S. forces from South Vietnam in 1973; the
fall of Saigon in 1975; and, the pullout of U.S. forces from
Thailand and Taiwan in 1976.
Up to 1975, the Asian policies of the U.S. had relied on
its ability to influence events on the Asian mainland through a
U.S. military presence in the region. The significant reduction
of this presence after Vietnam brought into question in Bangkok
and other Asian capitals the future regional role or position for
the United States.
After 1976, other events continued to reinforce Thai
perceptions of a U.S. retrenchment of interests. Several of
these included: President Carter's announcement of a phased
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea in 1977; the possible
adoption of a "swing strategy" by the U.S. Navy to reapportion
forces from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean to meet challenges in
the Persian Gulf; U.S. failure to prevent the fall of the Shah of
Iran in 1979; the build-up of Soviet troop concentrations in the
Northern Territories (of Japan); and, Soviet acquisition of naval
and air facilities in Vietnam and Cambodia coupled with the
steady enhancement of Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean and
the Pacific.
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The reduction of American regional presence and Asian
perceptions of diminished dependability and reliability were
determining factors in Bangkok's desire for more comprehensive
security arrangements. For Thailand, the drive for more
comprehensive security would include more active and independent
political, economic, and diplomatic strategies, the strengthening
of national defense forces, and closer political cooperation with
other emerging powers in the region to include the Soviet Union
and the PRC.
Between 1975 and 1978, the historical buffer between the
Thais and the Vietnamese remained precariously in tact by the
absence of Vietnamese troops in Laos and through the tragic and
genocidal reign of the PRC-supported Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. In
1978, the Soviets and the Vietnamese formalized their alliance by
the conclusion of a twenty-five year Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation. With Soviet-supported Vietnam now poised to realize
their goal of political and military influence over Indochina,
Thai threat perceptions were transformed from an internal to an
external orientation eastward. Thailand was now faced with the
prospect of dealing with an ancient enemy larger and more
powerful that at any recent time.
The reality of the growing external threat from the east
complicated the calculus of the Thai internal security equation
in that there had been no reduction in its problem with a
domestic insurgency which continued to blossom in intensity and
geographic scope. Insurgent ranks had multiplied to a total of
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about 12-14,000 armed guerrillas by 1979. With this force, the
insurgents were able to directly control over 400 villages and
exert some degree of influence over 6,000 more with a combined
population of nearly 4 million, and to conduct combat operations
in well over half of Thailand's 71 provinces. [Ref. 30]
5. Wither the CPT
The break in Sino-Viet relations in 1974-5 had an
ultimately crippling effect on the CPT insurgency in Thailand.
In 1979, the PRC made renewed efforts to separate party-party
from government-government relations in Southeast Asia. This
meant a departure from its former policies of open material and
ideological support for regional communist insurgency movements
and a move toward more anti-Soviet policies. In Thailand, PRC
material support to the CPT ceased in 1979 as did broadcasts from
the Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT) which went off the air
on July 11, 1979. Because of its former anti-Vietnamese
orientation, the CPT subsequently lost its access to sanctuary in
Laos and Cambodia. Under increasing pressure from Thai
counterinsurgency programs and without a foreign sponsor, the CPT
rapidly withered.
In the face of concerted Thai political, military and
civic action efforts, the strength of the insurgents is estimated
to have declined from a total of 12-14,000 armed men and women in
1979 to less than 2500 today. On 2 December 1989, the Communist
Party of Malaysia, an insurgent group operating in the southern
provinces of the Isthmus of Kra along the Malaysian border signed
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peace agreements with the governments of Thailand and Malaysia.
Estimates of remaining insurgent forces at the date of signing
was put at 1188. These insurgents were to remain in former areas
of operations for six months to dismantle or demolish booby
traps. Aside from these forces, strength of remaining active
insurgent groups are reportedly as follows: [Ref. 31]
Communist Party of Thailand 600
Thai Peoples Revolutionary Movement 1500
Patani United Liberation Organization (Muslim)
Barisan Revolusi Nasional (Muslim) 400
With respect to the CPT, the loss of PRC support is not
likely to be replaced by support from Vietnam. In the coming
years, Hanoi will continue to lobby the West, particularly the
United States, for improved relations. In doing so, it will be
increasingly important for Hanoi to be successful portraying the
PRC as the greatest regional threat. Any surge in Vietnamese or
client state support for smoldering regional insurgencies would
be a politically crippling evolution and would perpetuate the
image of a Soviet-supported Vietnam as the most aggressive
regional threat.
To acknowledge the closing of the VOPT, (former)
Thai Prime Minister Prem ordered the closure of a Chinese-
language radio station that had been set up in 1956 to counter
communist propaganda. Although Prem's actions were reportedly
taken for financial reasons, it was more likely done to prevent
the station from being used for political or subversive purposes
that would impede improving Sino-Thai relations.
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The PRC hoped that reduction of military aid to regional
communist insurgency forces would improve its image with Western
powers and ASEAN in order to acquire access to Western military
assistance. In the case of the U.S., this was ultimately
successful as military relations between the U.S. and the PRC were
established in January 1980.
6. The Soviet-Vietnamese Alliance
In 1978-79, the political and military situation in
Southeast Asia was transformed by the signing of the Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviets and the
Vietnamese, the ouster of PRC personnel and influence from
Vietnam, and the subsequent invasion of Cambodia by the
Vietnamese. This latter act most seriously threatened to shift
the strategic balance in the region. Beginning on Christmas day
in 1978 the Vietnamese, backed by massive Soviet arms aid and
Moscow's diplomatic support, launched a full scale offensive
against Cambodia along multiple axes of advance with 14 divisions
totaling 120,000 combat troops. By 7 January 1979, the
Vietnamese had taken Phnom Penh and on 10 January, installed a
puppet government headed by Heng Samrin. By mid-January 1979,
the remnants of the Khmcr Rouge forces had been driven into the
Dangrek Mountains in the north and the Cardamom and Elephant
Mountains in the southwest, as well as into Thai/PRC supervised
insurgent bases and refugee camps in Thailand.
7. A Buffer Rebuffed
For Thailand, the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia was
important for the maintenance of a buffer between itself and its
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historical enemy, the Vietnamese. Prior to December 1978, the
absence of strong Vietnamese influence in Laos and the presence
of an anti-Vietnamese government in Cambodia (the Khmer Rouge)
represented for Thailand a suitable "cushion" between itself and
the Vietnamese.
After securing its control over South Vietnam, the North
Vietnamese, using border incursions by the aggressive Khmer Rouge
as a pretense, successfully invaded Cambodia and acquired
control over the strategic buffer territory of Cambodia and,
through occupation by over 50,000+ of its ground forces, Laos.
In doing so, Vietnam thereby preempted the influence or control
over this territory by Thailand or any Western power and gained
for itself the political-strategic advantage of occupation, as
costly as it would eventually prove to be. The movement of
Vietnamese forces into Cambodia and Laos was not really
surprising and was probably not driven solely by the border
incursions of the Khmer Rouge or even the presence of a PRC-
supported government in Phnom Penh.
Throughout the 1950 and 1960's, the Vietnamese had
supported the communist movements of the Pathet Lao in Laos and
trained Thai-Lao cadres in North Vietnam in support of the
insurgency in northeastern Thailand. In North Vietnam, training
for CPT insurgents was conducted at the Hoa Binh training school
on the outskirts of Hanoi. First reported opened in 1962, early
graduates were reinfiltrated back into northern Thailand for the
conduct of low-key propaganda activities. Later, weapons as well
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as propaganda training was conducted. Between 1962 and 1965, over
500 insurgents were reported to have been trained at Hoa Binh.
[Ref. 32] This number rose to 1500 between 1967-1969 [Ref. 33].
Other training sites were located in Pathet-Lao controlled
areas of Laos and in Yunnan Province of the PRC.
With large Vietnamese populations in northeast Thailand
(approximately 40,000), and eastern Cambodia, and with veteran
insurgent organizations in Laos, North Vietnam was in a position
to potentially rebuild the foundations for an Indochinese
Federation [Ref. 34). However, military problems in subduing
the communist and non-communist resistance forces, a rapidly
deteriorating national economy, and Moscow's increasing
impatience with the inability of its ally to resolve the
Cambodian imbroglio required Vietnam to eventually agree to a
withdrawal of its forces (reportedly achieved by September 1989)
from Cambodia and proceed with efforts to increase its political
and economic ties with regional nations.
Although much was made of the withdrawal of Vietnamese
forces in 1987-1989, evidence today indicates that not all
Vietnamese forces have been withdrawn and some Vietnamese forces
have been re-introduced into Cambodia in response to Khmer Rouge
military successes in the western battle areas. The prolongation
of Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia will continue to concern
Thailand, require the continued involvement of the PRC in the
conflict, and exacerbate differences of opinion within ASEAN over
just which country represents the greatest regional threat: the
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PRC or Vietnam. ASEAN will also remain divided over which
country should represent the true Indochinese "strategic buffer":
Cambodia to contain the Vietnamese threat or Thailand to contain
the PRC.
For Thailand, "fulcrum" status in Southeast Asia,
implying a key economic and political position for it in any
future regional perspective, is an acceptable and much sought
after position. It's consideration as a "buffer" state between
Malaysia and Indonesia and the perceived military ambitions of
the PRC is an absolutely unacceptable position.
Besides the obvious threat from the 180,000 Vietnamese
troops, Thailand was forced to deal with a tremendous flood of
refugees that had begun in April of 1975 brought about by the
genocidal "Year Zero" policies of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge.
Cambodian refugees in Thailand today number over 300,000. With
Vietnamese influence firmly entrenched in Laos and Cambodia,
Thailand's desire for a security buffer between it and Vietnam
was now out of the question.
Thailand also recognized the increasing presence and
possible influence of the Soviet Union in the region. The
reduced level of U.S. defense commitments to mainland Southeast
Asia, the Vietnamese alliance with the Soviet Union, and the
increased military presence of the Soviets in the South China Sea
and Indian Ocean, removed the geographical impediments which had
hitherto made the Soviet threat a remote one and underlined the
Soviet potential in the region. [Ref. 35]
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8. Sino-Thai Relations Improve
Border incursions by Vietnamese and Laotian forces plus
periodic occupation of Thai territory in the eastern and northern
border states made the mutual relationship between the PRC and
Thailand more crucial. For Thailand, a relationship with the PRC
and the U.S. represented a significant counterbalance to Soviet
and Soviet client state hegemonism in Indochina. If Vietnamese
forces could be contained and eventually forced to withdraw from
Laos and Cambodia by a combination of diplomatic means and
demonstrated resolve on the part of the PRC, the U.S., and ASEAN,
the buffer would once again be established and Thailand's borders
to the north and east secured from immediate external threat.
"For Thailand, the PRC would become an important security
guarantor against Vietnam by demonstrating its willingness to put
pressures on Hanoi's northern border whenever the Vietnamese
attacked the Cambodian resistance on the Thai frontier."
[Ref. 36]
9. A Lesson for Vietnam?
Fearing successful Vietnamese hegemonism over its client
state Cambodia, and loss of influence in Southeast Asia, the PRC
launched a military offensive against Vietnam on 17 February 1979
to "teach Vietnam a lesson." Attacking through six Vietnamese
provinces with a force of 20 divisions, the conflict lasted for
17 days, after which the PRC withdrew its forces. Although
extensive damage was done in the battle area and casualties were
high on both sides, its arguable who gave and who received the
29
"the lesson". Although the threat of future PRC invasions would
force the Vietnamese to k-ep close to 600,000 forces on the
border for defense, the PRC insursion did not change the status
of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia.
The PRC was alarmed over what it perceived as Vietnamese,
and ultimately Soviet, intentions to expand their influence
throughout the whole of Southeast Asia, initially through
Kampuchea and then to Thailand [Ref. 37]. The PRC's traditional
policy of maintaining a weak and divided Southeast Asia was at
risk if the Vietnamese could obtain lasting political and
military influence over the communist Indochinese states. The
PRC's perception that the Vietnamese were being used as
proxies for Soviet encirclement of the PRC, and the PRC's desire
to maintain its support to its Cambodian ally, the Khmer Rouge,
brought about a hard-line stance against the Vietnamese
occupation of Cambodia.
10. Poker Chips and New Alliances
Thailand's strong opposition to the Vietnamese occupation
of Cambodia permitted Thailand and the PRC to develop a political
and military relationship that would be partly responsible for
the denial of Vietnamese hegemony over Cambodia and would
contribute to the maintenance of international sanctions against
the Vietnamese. The fact that Thailand would contemplate
establishing a military relationship with the PRC is not surprising
considering Thailand's diplomatic history of accommodating
whomever it considered the most politically and militarily
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influential power in the region at the time. Putting this into
perspective, Professor Claude Buss related during a seminar at
the Naval Postgraduate School that Sukhumbhand Paribatra of
Chulalongkorn University once remarked: "When at a poker game and
you want to find the Thai, just look behind the player who is
holding the biggest pile of chips."
"The parameters of the evolving Sino-Thai military
relationship were shaped foremost hy the significance Chinese
policy makers attached to the Southeast Asian situation, and the
role of Thailand in the Kampuchean question [Ref. 38]. The PRC's
strategic goals in the region, which closely paralleled those of
Thailand, consisted of five main points:
1. Removal of Soviet support for Vietnam
2. Dismantling of Soviet-Viet Alliance and removal of the
bases
3. Adversity to the formation of an Indochinese Confederation
with Vietnam as its leadership
4. A checkage of the expansion of the Soviet Pacific Fleet
5. A neutralization of the Soviet military encirclement in the
region [Ref. 39].
C. SUMMARY
A decreased willingness on the part of the U.S. to become
involved militarily in conflicts abroad stemming from its Vietnam
experience caused Thailand to look elsewhere to assure its
security against the very real and growing threat to the east.
Although formal U.S./Thai security treaties remained intact,
Thailand felt its future security could not be solely rooted in a
dependence on its traditional ally, the U.S., for two reasons.
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First, the age of the Manila Pact and the Rusk-Thanat
Communique as well as Washington's willingness to allow the
demise of SEATO in 1977 with only a cryptic statement by the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, made the Thai's suspect that
while the U.S. "...does stand by its old commitments..." the
Carter Administration "...would make its own judgments [in a
crisis] depending on the specific circumstances [Ref. 40]. In
other words, the Thais feared that U.S. military action would be
guided more by true nat±onal interests rather than by vague and
aging security agreements.
Secondly, there was little U.S. physical presence in Thailand
that would have served as a "tripwire", like that in South Korea,
requiring for an automatic U.S. military response if Thailand
were attacked. Psychological and political factors made it
highly unlikely that the American people would see a need to
defend Thailand should an attack occur, especially considering
the country's remote geographic location. More pragmatically,
Thailand felt that enhanced regional security against growing
Soviet-inspired and supported Vietnamese hegemonism could only be
enhanced by closer economic, political, and military contacts
with the Chinese.
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III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY RELATIONSHIP (1979-1990)
A. THE CONDITIONS AT BIRTH
1. First Offers of Military Assistance
Vietnam's incursions into Laos and Kampuchea raised fears
in the PRC that Vietnam, with support and direction from the
Soviet Union, was attempting to consolidate a dominant position
for itself in Indochina and rekindle the specter of an
Indochinese Federation with Vietnam at the helm. In June 1979,
the PRC pledged support, including military assistance, to
Thailand if it was invaded by Vietnam. This was followed in
December by a visit from a People's Liberation Army military
delegation which was sent to Thailand to emphasize the PRC's
support should Vietnam open an offensive against Thailand. To
accommodate Thai concerns regarding Chinese support for the Khmer
Rouge, the PRC agreed to provide military assistance to the non-
communist resistance groups as well. Between 1980-1983, high
level exchange visits between various branches of the Thai
military and the PRC continued. Although these delegations
exchanged mutual concerns regarding the Indochinese situation,
there is no evidence that arms sales or transfer agreements were
made. Joint U.S.-Thai logistics planning efforts were also
stepped up in May 1981 in response to "lessons learned" from the
Vietnamese incursions into Thai territory at Norn Mark Moon
during June 1980.
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The first indication of the new direction of Sino-Thai
military relations occurred between 1984 and 1986 when the
groundwork was laid for the acquisition and incorporation of
Chinese military equipment into the Thai Armed Forces. In 1984,
Thailand reportedly conducted negotiations with the Chinese to
acquire a reconnaissance version of the Chinese F-7 aircraft.
The terms of these negotiations were unclear and none of these
aircraft were delivered to Thailand.
2. The Political Game In Bangkok
As Thailand sought to enter into this new relationship,
domestic Thai politics were tense as trouble brewed between Prime
Minister Prem and the Thai Army Commander-in-Chief Arthit over
various issues including Thai currency devaluation and the
political role of military officers. The military was
factionalized by those desiring a wider role in politics and
those who felt the military should decrease its involvement in
politics, particularly coup plotting as a means of replacing
elected governments.
In late 1984, an imminent confrontation between the
opposing factions of Prem and Arthit was averted through the
tempering influence of the King and his stated desire for the
continued progression of the democratic process in Thai politics.
In September 1985, a weak and disorganized coup attempt failed.
Observers cited two reasons for its failure. The first was
factiousness in the military. The other was the perceived
obsolescence of a coup, a view shared by a widening circle of
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military officers, senior civil servants, businessmen,
financiers, industrialists, white-collar executives,
intellectuals and significantly, by the King as well. [Ref. 41]
The easing of domestic political tensions and an
evaluation of Thailand's vulnerable military position after the
1984-1985 Vietnamese dry season offensive, the largest since its
invasion of Cambodia, hastened Thailand's decision to enter into
a military relationship with the PRC.
B. THE PROGRESS OF SINO-THAI MILITARY RELATIONS
1. 1985-The First Chinese Arms Arrive
In March 1985, it was announced that, as part of a
military grant from the PRC, Thailand would receive 24 x Model 59
Main Battle Tanks (MBT), 18 X 130mm towed artillery pieces and 12
X 37mm anti-aircraft (AAA) guns. It was the first major military
grant aid from the PRC for the Thai armed forces and came at a
time just prior to the commencement of Vietnamese dry season
offensive activity in Cambodia. Although the PRC's expressed
purpose for providing the equipment was for defense against
Vietnamese intrusions along the border, it probably was also to
acquaint the Thai's with the quality, simplicity, and
availability of PRC military equipment.
At this time, both the U.S. and Germany were working to
secure a contract to provide main battle tanks to the Thai mili-
tary. The Germans were offering the Leopard-i and the U.S. was
attempting to sell the Thais the Commando Sting Ray. Bids had
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also been made by Britain and Sweden. The Chinese tanks were to
be kept at the Lop Buri-based Calvary center while the artillery
pieces were to be initially located at the Lop Buri-based
Artillery center for testing. [Ref. 42]
2. 1987-The U.S. Stockpile and PRC Arms for Modernization
There were few reported military contacts between the PRC
and Thailand in 1986, however, two key events in 1987 significantly
enhanced Thailand's military position. First, on 9 January 1987,
Washington and Bangkok signed an agreement to establish a $100
million War Reserve Stockpile in Nakhon Ratchasima Province,
Thailand (See Appendix H) for use by both countries in case of a
military emergency.
U.S. stockpiling in Thailand was originally proposed in
1985 during a meeting in New York between Defense Secretary
Weinberger and PM Prem when the two leaders signed a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) concerning logistics support. This MOU
formalized U.S. guaranteed delivery of U.S. weapons and
equipment, specifically from the Special Defense Acquisitions
Fund (SDAF); a stockpile of long lead-time items in the U.S.
arsenal available only to select allies. This agreement would
make it easier for the Thai's to plug directly into the U.S.
supply system for critical items. [Ref. 43] Regarding the 1987
agreement, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand William Brown stated that
the agreement would provide an "...increased measure of
security...and help promote peace and stability to Southeast
Asia..." [Ref. 44].
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According to the 1987 agreement signed by Thai Defense
Minister Phaniong and U.S. Ambassador Brown, the U.S. and
Thailand will each contribute $50 million in weapons and
equipment (primarily artillery, tank, and mortar ammunition, and
anti-tank missiles) to the stockpile over a 5-year period and
will be required to consult with the other before drawing on it.
The agreement does allow the U.S. to use the stockpile for
military operations beyond Thailand, but it is not likely in view
of U.S. bases and logistics assets in the Philippines, South
Korea, and Japan. [Ref. 45] No nuclear weapons will be in the
stockpile. This stockpile will upgrade Thai logistic
capabilities and permit the Thai military to plug into the U.S.
supply system more efficiently. The concept is similar to that
employed during the Vietnam Conflict when the U.S. established a
similar stockpile in Korat, Thailand [Ref. 46].
There was one legislative obstacle that had to be
overcome before the stockpile could be activated. "A sticking
point was, before the agreement could be implemented, Section
514c of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 would have to be
amended and the U.S. Congress would need to give its approval
[Ref. 47]. As written, the Act stated such stockpiles could
only be kept in NATO countries, the Republic of Korea, or in
areas where the U.S. had military bases or was the primary user
of a base [Ref. 48]. Congressional approval was granted for
establishment of the Thai-U.S. stockpile on 22 December 1987 by
House Joint Resolution 395 and Public Law 100-102, 101 statute
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1329 under which Thailand was added to Section 514c of the
Foreign Assistance Act. The stockpile began operations in October
1988 with the first deliveries of supplies occurring in November
1988.
Secondly, 1987 marked the first major series of arms
purchases by Thailand from the PRC. In March 1987, it was
announced that the Thais were considering purchasing a large
number of PRC 57mm or 37mm Anti-Aircraft artillery (AAA) (P-74)
for airbase defense. The AAA weapons would provide airbase
defense in the provinces of Nakhon Sawan, Nakhon Ratchasima,
Ubon Ratchathani, and Udon Thani. Although the PRC also offered
to sell the Thai Air Force the F-7 fighter, the offer was
declined. [Ref. 49]
Other PRC weapons and equipment considered for
acquisition at this time were Type 6911 MBT's, YW-531H Armored
Personnel Carriers (APC), additional AAA guns, and 130mm
artillery ammunition. If purchased, th tanks would be used to
form a tank battalion for the 2nd Calvary Division at Saraburi.
The tanks were to be sold at a "friendship price" which amounted
to 10% of their value with lengthy payment terms. The PRC arms
manufacturing company Norinco was to handle the sale. To assist
with the purchase, the Thai Cabinet agreed to cut import duty
requirements on military arms and equipment from the PRC and
permit PRC freighters to transport the military supplies to
Thailand. Also included in the deal were some additional T-59
MBT's, delivered at no cost. As of March 1987, Thailand had
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received approximately 36 X 130mm artillery pieces and between
20,000-30,000 rounds of ammunition. The PRC had also offered to
sell the Thai's 155mm towed howitzers, additional 130mm guns,
Model 84 bridge laying tanks, and Type 653 Armor Recovery
Vehicles (ARV). [Ref. 50]
After careful consideration of the Chinese offer, Army
Commander in Chief General Chawalit Yongchaiyut approved the
purchase of 30 X T-691I MBT, 400 X YW-531H APC's, 24 X Type 59
towed artillery, 24-30 X 37mm AAA guns, 25 X 57mm AAA guns, 16 X
ARV 653, and 4 X Model 84 bridge laying tanks during a May visit
to PRC. Delivery was scheduled for Septembei-Oc.ber 1987.
[Ref. 51]
With respect to Thailand's desire to purchase light
tanks, it was announced in May 1987 that it had decided to
procure 150 X Stingray light tanks from the Cadillac Gage Company
of the U.S. In September 1987, Thailand took delivery of
approximately 423 Type 6911 MBTs and YW-531H APCs purchased in
May 1987.
3. 1988-Picking Up The Pace of Chinese Arms Acquisitions
From December 1987 through February 1988, Thai forces
became decisively engaged with a Laotian ground force in the
vicinity of Ban Romklao in the province of Phitsanulok. (See
Appendix C). The intensity of the engagement quickly depleted
existing stocks of Thai artillery and other military supplies
requiring an emergency airlift of equipment from the U.S. It was
reported that the PRC also assisted in supplying ammunition to
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Thai forces. In February 1988, the Thais were forced to seek a
cease fire from the Laotians after suffering a loss of over 300
personnel killed and e::penditure of US$120 million worth of
ammunition. [Ref. 52]
Taking a lesson from this experience as well as the
earlier effort by the U.S., the Chinese considered opening talks
with the Thais regarding the establishment of a Chinese stockpile
of military supplies to support the increasing amount of Chinese
military equipment in Thai inventories. This was to be somewhat
more awkward for the Chinese than for the U.S. because of the
lack of a formal security assistance agreement between Thailand
and the PRC. [Ref. 53]
During April-May 1988, Army CINC General Chawalit
approved the purchase of 23 X T-6911 MBT's, 360 YW-531H APC's, an
AAA radar control system, a surface-to-air missile (SAM) HN-5
missile guidance system, 38 X 130mm (Type 59) towed artillery,
and 9 minesweepers for the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) from the PRC.
The purchase was worth US$47 million, was to be delivered in 6
months, and paid for over a 6 year period with no interest.
[Ref. 54] The tanks were sold for approximately US$ 400,000 (9.1
million Baht)-a price representing a reduction by half of that
which the first lot of MBT's bought for the calvary in Saraburi
were acquired for in 1987. Also, these tanks were fitted with
105mm vice 100mm main guns on the earlier purchased vehicles.
Chawalit was also offered 4 Jianghu Frigates and three Romeo
diesel submarines for "friendship prices". The frigates were
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offered for US$270 million. Chawalit took the offer under
consideration. [Ref 55]
Following up on the January 1987 U.S. War Reserve
Stockpile Agreement, an Appendix was signed 1 April by General
Chawalit and BGen Peter Lash, Commander of the USJUSMAG in
Thailand clarifying composition and control of the stockpile's
contents. Also during April, it appears that talks for the
establishment of a PRC stockpile of ammunition and spare parts
were initiated during a visit to the PRC by the Thai Army Deputy
Commander-in-Chief General Wanchai Ruangtrakun.
Regarding the stockpile issue, General Chawalit in June
1987 expressed the desire for the establishment of War Reserve
Stockpiles with the other countries from whom Thailand was
purchasing weapons and equipment. These stockpile plans would
include Singapore, West Germany, and Britain. General Chawalit
felt that, like the deal with the U.S., stockpiling would assist
in streamlining logistics procedures, avoid supply lags during
periods of crisis and would support Thailand's policy of arms
diversification. [Ref. 56]
Acting on an earlier offer from the PRC, Thailand signed
an agreement in September 1988 to buy 4 Chinese Jianghu-class
frigates at a total cost of US$270 million. The first frigate
was Pxprte to be delivered in February 1991 with the other
delivered every 4-6 months after the first. At this time it was
planned that the ships be equipped with anti-ship guided
missiles, possibly the PRC C-801 or CSS-::-4, the U.S. Harpoon.
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During a November 1988 visit to the PRC, Thai Army CINC
General Chawalit signed another major arms agreement with the PRC
for 30 X T-6911 MBT and 400 X Type 63Mk2 Armored Cars. Thailand
also expressed interest in purchasing a squadron of F-M's and
three Romeo diesel submarines. [Ref. 57]
The military relationship between Thailand and the PRC
continued to grow during this period primarily because of the
Thai's satisfaction with the PRC's rapid response to arms
requests, especially during periods of crisis such as the Chong
Bok Pass and Ban Ramklao border incidents. In explaining why
Thailand had continued to seek an expansion of its military
relationship with the PRC, General Chawalit said [of the PRC],
"We received the weapons soon after we had asked for them while
American weapons always came after the fighting ended, and the
transportation was costly. Chinese arms are modern and suitable
for Thailand considering the country's financial situation."
[Ref. 58] In an article in the New York Times, Barbara Crossette
defined the relationship as follows:
Thais understand, respect, and appreciate power and what
power can achieve, especially in terms of survival and
progress. After the end of Pax Americana in Southeast Asia,
China's ability and willingness to offer Thailand protection
has been one of the bases for the development of close
bilateral ties, especially in the security area. [Ref. 59]
4. 1989-The Relationship Takes a Breath
In January 1989, [then] Army CINC General Chawalit
approved the purchase of 2 Romeo submarines from the PRC. The
submarines were to be used to guard the sea routes along the
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coasts, protect oil and gas assets in the Gulf of Thailand, and
provide security for the Eastern and Southern Seaboard Industrial
Zones. The old Thai fleet of 4 submarines had been
decommissioned on 30 November 1955. They were old Japanese
submarines made by Mitsubishi and had been originally
commissioned in 1938. During this period the RTN also discussed
the possibility of purchasing PRC P-74 37mm AAA to replace the
aging 40mm AAA currently in use by the Royal Thai Marine Corps
(RTMC).
During the first months of 1989, Thai plans to acquire
the PRC F-7M fighter aircraft were put on hold for further study
and consideration. One of Thailand's fears was that if the RTAF
procured the F-7M, the Soviets would equip the Laotian, Cambodian
and Vietnamese forces with the Mig-23. It was also reported that
the PRC had offered to sell Thailand the A-5M, the PRC's latest
aircraft built under a joint development scheme with Europe (PRC
airframe, European flying and weapon systems). The Thais
declined the offer. [Ref. 60)
Thailand's first steps towards establishing an export-
oriented arms industry were taken in February and April of 1989
when Thailand signed agreements with the PRC for the coproduction
of spare parts for PRC tanks and APC's as well as rubber road
wheels for West German Leopard tanks. The project to manufacture
the spare parts was approved by the Thai Dlfense Ministry in
April. The project was to be initially between the Thai Sugo
Engineering Company and the PRC North Industry Corporation
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(NORINCO). At this time, it was envisioned that the factory
would initially manufacture spare parts but would later expand
operations to cover assembling the T-6911 MBT for the armed
forces of both countries as well as interested third parties.
The factory was to be sited in Lop Buri Province. (See Appendix
H). Aside from the benefits of local production of spare parts,
the Thai government felt that the opportunity to enter the arms
export business would contribute to the further development of
Thai defense technology. [Ref. 61)
Interestingly, this was not the first reported offer by
the PRC for a joint Sino-Thai arms production venture. In 1982,
the PRC offered to establish a joint arms production venture with
the Thais after unofficial Thai inquiries about the possibility
of Thai arms purchases from the PRC. At this time, the Thais
did not respond to the PRC offer citing that "the issue of a
joint Thai-Chinese arms production venture could be a sensitive
move and that Thailand should look at the proposal 'from all
aspects'. [Ref. 621
The development of a national arms industry would be
beneficial for the Thais for a number of reasons. Several of
these include:
- reduction of reliance on foreign suppliers for weapon systems,
spare parts, or supplies
- avoidance of political strings attached to arms imports
- capability to supply arms in exchange for political leverage
- political prestige through defense industrialization
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- reduction of domestic defense expenditures (import
substitution)
- spin-off opportunities for civilian industry
- capability to design weapons to meet geographical requirements
of the battlefield
- attract production of foreign weapons for employment
opportunities and foreign exchange
In May 1989, conflicting reports stated that the Royal
Thai Air Force was still considering the purchase of 24 Chinese
F-7M fighter aircraft. However, by late 1989, Thai interest in
the F-7M waned and the Thai's did not procure this aircraft. In
June, Thailand reportedly ordered an additional 53 X T-6911 MBTs,
410 YW-531H APCs, and 360 X Type 63Mk2 armored cars from the PRC.
[Ref. 63]
The events of June 1989 in the PRC (Tienamen Square
incident) posed temporary problems for the Sino-Thai military
relationship. In July 1989, the Thais began seeking a revival of
intelligence exchange and a renewal of stronger U.S./Thai
military relations, including the possibility of joint ventures
to produce U.S. arms in Thailand, due to the growing uncertainty
about Sino-Thai military cooperation following events in
Tienamen. No doubt tied to these overtures was the resurrection
of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits from the U.S. to Thailand
which had been suspended in 1986. The events in Tienamen Square
also forced Thailand to put on hold several proposed Sino-Thai
joint ventures to produce APC's as well as plans to establish a
joint Sino-Thai War Reserve Stockpile.
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Thai/U.S. military ties had deteriorated steadily over
the past several years because of cutbacks in U.S. military
assistance (See Appendix I) and U.S. charges that senior Thai
military officers had misappropriated U.S. covert funds for non-
communist Khmer resistance forces. Exacerbating the flagging
relationship were Thai complaints of delays in delivery of U.S.
arms and equipment during past times of crisis. However, in
these latest overtures to the U.S., the Thais were not seeking
more military assistance but were "looking for advanced U.S.
weaponry to compliment the Thai Army's defense capabilities
through existing military assistance programs." [Ref. 64] A
sign of the willingness to renew U.S./Thai military relationships
was the Thai Cabinet's approval for the purchase of 25 new U.S.
Bell helicopters for establishment of the country's first
airborne calvary regiment in the 3d Army region.
In renewed arms purchasing activity with the PRC, the
Royal Thai Navy (RTN) signed a contract with the PRC in October
1989 for the construction of two additional helo-equipped ASW
Type 25T frigates for US$303 million during the September visit
of Zou Jiahua, PRC Minister of Machine Building and Electronics
Industry [Ref. 65]. According to a reliable source, the two
frigates are scheduled to be 2500-3000 tons displacement, be
powered by U.S. LM-2500 gas-turbine engines, and be armed with
ship-to-ship (Harpoon or PRC C-801) and surface-to-air missiles.
The RTN's vigorous modernizaton program is dimed at
fulfilling its projected role in the defense of the new Eastern and
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Southern Seaboard Industrial Zones, as well as patrol
responsibilities in the Mekong river, the Andaman Sea, and the
Gulf of Thailand. Most notable naval modernization efforts thus
far have included:
- contract with the PRC for the construction of 6 frigates
- possible acquisition of 6 X 2-9A (Dauphin) helicopters for
use on the Type 25T helo-capable frigates.
- approval for purchase of Chinese C-801 surface-to-surface
missile for use on the PRC frigates
- consideration for the purchase of 3 PRC Romeo diesel
submarines
- continued receipt of PRC 37mm AAA guns to replace aging
stocks of 40mm AAA
- formation of an AAA Division
- plans to upgrade the RTMC from two regiments to a division
- establishment of a RTMC tank battalion and acquisition of
addition artillery for enhancement of RTMC fire support
capabilities
- and, the planned acquisition of shore based coastal defense
missiles and medium sized patrol boats. [Ref. 66]
5. Arms Purchases in Review
To summarize purchases of major items of PRC military
equipment between 1985 and 1990 as can best be determined from
unclassified data available, it appears that as of January 1990,
Thailand had ordered and received 72 X Type 6911 MBT's (100mm and
105 mm), 16 X ARV 653, 4 X Model 84 bridge laying tanks, 400 X
YW-531H APC, 24 X 57mm and 36 X 37mm AAA, and 36 X Type 59 130mm
towed artillery. On order but yet to be delivered was 64 X T6911
MBT. 770 X YW-531H APC, 760 X Type 63Mk2 armored cars, 28 X Type
59 130mm towed artillery, 4 X Jianghu-class frigates, 2X Type 25T
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frigates, 9 X minesweepers, and 2-3 Romeo-class diesel
submarines. (See Appendices J and K).
In May 1990, the Thai Cabinet approved a request from the
RTN to buy C-801 surface-to-surface missiles from the PRC. The
missiles will be installed on the six Chinese frigates purchased
earlier. The deal was worth over US$40 million and is scheduled
to be paid for in five installments between 1990 and 1994.
[Ref. 67]
6. Summary
Thailand's progress toward conventionally upgrading its
military forces is proceeding rapidly with respect to the
acquisition of modern military equipment. On 7 May 1990, former
Defense Minister Chawalit stated that "...a stronger military
force should go hand-in-hand with economic and investment
development. Investment and other assets must be granted
security and protection. This means that the Thai Armed Forces
must have the strength to protect the economy and industry."
[Ref. 68] Recent reports indicate US$3.7 billion has been
earmarked for weapons modernization over the next decade [Ref.
69]. Accordingly, many changes are in the wind for the Thai
Armed Forces in the coming years as they continue their
transition to a modern conventional military force.
For the RTA, this will mean the mechanization of its five
infantry divisions, the addition of a third Calvary division, the
establishment of an airborne Calvary regime-t, and a substantial
strengthening of its Armored division. When added to existing
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inventories and other armor and mechanized equipment on order or
delivered from other suppliers, the 136 tanks and 1900+ APCs from
the PRC will contribute substantially to the achievement of these
goals.
The RTN hopes to modify existing shipping to accommodate
the Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing (V/STOL) Harrier-2,
upgrade the naval dockyard at Pom Prachun into a more operational
ship repair facility, and is negotiating with Bremer Vulcan and
Blohm and Voss of West Germany to acquire 2-4 helicopter carriers
to protect the east coast and Southern Seaboard Industrial
Projects and the Thai petrochemical industry. This is a very
ambitious venture for the RTN and will face tough budget battles
in the Thai Senate. The RTAF hopes to replace its aging fleet of
A-37's with a squadron of Italian AMX and is looking at the
purchase of Tornado or Mirage 2000 aircraft as compliments to its
fleet of F-5 and F-16s. It has determined that the U.S. A-1O and
A-7 are too expensive. The RTAF is also looking to upgrade
several airfields including Surat Thani, Songkhla and Hat Yai to
contribute to air defense of the proposed Southern Seaboard
Industrial Project. Unless the U.S. can offer the Thais more
ecmoomically attractive arms deals, the PRC's overall
contribution as an arms supplier will continue to be a key factor
both from a military and, perhaps more importantly, an economic
standpoint for the military modernization goals of the Thai
government.
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C. CHINESE MOTIVES FOR PROVIDING AID TO THAILAND
In Mao's day, arms dealers were characterized as "merchants
of death". Today, "The PRC has dropped this linguistic attack
and instead initiated a highly visible arms export drive. [Ref.
70] The PRC is now amongst the top ten of the world's largest arms
exporters and is the premier arms exporter to the Third World.
The PRC has been engaged in vigorous arms exports to the Middle
East (Jordan, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia), Africa (Egypt,
Zaire, Sudan, Tanzania, Algeria), South Asia (Pakistan), North
Korea, guerrilla movements in Afghanistan and Cambodia, and is
the highest volume dealer of major end items of ground forces
equipment to Thailand.
This shift in policy can be attributed to Chinese political,
economic, and military concerns. First and foremost, the foreign
exchange acquired from the sale of arms in Thailand is sorely
needed to finance aggressive Chinese modernization programs.
This has become especially important to the PRC since the end of
the Iran-Iraq War has reduced to a trickle a previously heavy
demand for Chinese arms in this region.
Between 1980-1987, the PRC's Third World arms transfer
agreements totaled nearly US$11.1 billion dollars of which 74%
consisted of arms transfer agreements with Iran and Iraq
collectively. Of the PRC's US$8.7 billion total in arms
deliveries to the Third World during this same period, 69% or
US$6 billion consisted of arms deliveries to Iran and Iraq
collectively. [Ref. 71]
50
Second is the PRC's desire for a stable economic and
political environment in the region conducive to its continuing
modernization efforts. Newly established diplomatic relations
with the developing nations of Southeast Asia, particularly those
newly and rapidly industrializing nations, is expected to bring
new and much needed technological benefits. This includes all
ASEAN nations except Singapore.
Third, is to prevent encirclement by, and seek encirclement
of Soviet/Soviet client states in Indochina. This entails both a
land and sea aspect. With Soviet influence firmly entrenched in
Vietnam and India. and the Vietnamese retaining an influence on
the Hun Sen government in Cambodia, a government amicable to the
PRC in Thailand checkmates southerly encirclement across the
Indochina coastal rim. Because of the strong importance both
countries attach to the sealanes in the region, enhanced Sino-
Thai naval cooperation will provide a significant measure of
increased seaward security for Thai economic and military, as
well as Chinese South Sea Fleet, interests. [Ref. 72] This will
be especially beneficial to the PRC for enforcing its claims in
the Spratly Islands.
"Chinese analysts believe their greatest security-diplomatic
success within ASEAN to be the bonds the PRC has forged with
Thailand. They believe that Thailand will retain this special
relationship as a guarantee against Vietnamese intervention in
Cambodia, should the Cambodian outcome turn sour." [Ref. 73] For
the long term, this relationship will continue to offer Thailand a
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measure of assurance against Vietnamese expansion outside the
borders of Cambodia.
Fourth, Soviet internal and external problems have given the
PRC the opportunity to focus its attention away from its western
border with the Soviet Union and on countering Vietnamese
hegemonism in Indochina, as well as seeking more amiable ties
with ASEAN. In spite of the deployment of over 45 Soviet
divisions along the Sino-Soviet border, the Chinese perceive a
diminishing threat from this area because of Soviet attention to
its problems in Eastern Europe, increasingly expensive ties to
client states, economic and political difficulties at home and a
resurgence of the U.S.-backed allies in Wqestern Europe and Japan
committed to maintaining military power sufficient to keep Soviet
expansion in check.
Fifth, stronger ties with Thailand will enable continued
support for Chinese-backed Kampuchean resistance forces,
principally the Khmer Rouge. Although Thailand, as well as ASEAN
and the U.S., does not approve of nor desire the maintenance of a
strong Khmer Rouge, Thailand's support for resistance activities
in Kampuchea provide tacit support for the PRC's "geostrategic
motivations" in Indochina. [Ref. 74] This could become a critical
issue in the future if negotiations fail between the Cambodian
factions and the Hun Sen government.
And lastly, is the possibility for access to western
technology that is not available to the PRC through regular
security assistance programs. "CL ese officials now believe
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that assured retaliation requires technology for rapid assessment
of an attack and for quick launch of Chinese weapons.'[Ref. 75]
Although the PRC and the U.S. currently have security
assistance agreements in place (but on hold due to events in
Tienamen Square), there have been significant limits placed by
the U.S. Congress on the types and quantity of weapons sold to
the PRC. While there is currentl no evidence that the PRC is
using or even could use the agreements with Thailand to acquire
access to restricted U.S. technology, there are indications that
the Chinese have been successful with this tactic in the past.
As one observer noted in the case of Pakistan, "...it is believed
that the PRC obtained French FIRAGE jet fighters, EXOCET ship-to-
ship missiles and MAGIC air-to-air missiles, U.S. SIDEWINDER
air-to-air missiles and TOW anti-tank missiles, and U.S. artillery
technologies. U.S. F-16 jets in Pakistan were reportedly also
examined by Chinese personnel" [Ref. 76] Thailand is one of the
world's most recent recipients of the U.S. F-16.
D. THAI MOTIVES FOR ACCEPTING CHINESE MILITARY AID (See Appendix L)
After its experience in Vietnam and promulgation of the Nixon
Doctrine, the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia, including
Thailand, felt that the U.S. had distanced itself from Southeast
Asia, leaving conflicts to be handled or settled by the nations
of the region. "Since that time, many of these same nations have
obtained remarkable success in their economies. This has
facilitated the opinion in some Thai circles that while the
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relationship between the U.S. and Thailand will remain healthy,
it should no longer be special as it once was, but become more
business like on a more equal footing." [Ref. 77]
Although the U.S. has renewed its interest in Southeast Asia
because of the region's geostrategic position and economic
accomplishment, Thailand now seeks to follow its own political,
military, and economic policies free from U.S. influence. This
is partially because it and fellow Southeast Asian nations have
witnessed a fluctuating U.S. strategy which in a 30 year period
has transitioned through the various stages of regional defense,
containment, offensive action, flexible response, detente, and
now to the prospect of a withdrawal of U.S. military forces from
bases in the region.
For this and other reasons, "Washington's political will is
still suspect, particularly to the extent that ASEAN leaders
perceive that the U.S. must rely on the PRC to deal more
effectively with the Soviet Union." [Ref. 78] As such, Thailand
has sought to diversify its sources of arms and equipment,
accepting "gifts" and acquiring both western and, since 1985,
Chinese arms.
The Thai's also appreciate that there appears to be no
political strings attached to the PRC weapon sales. There has
been no known requests for the positioning of Chinese advisors or
technicians in Thailand. On the contrary, the PRC has been
content with offering maintenance and operational training to
Thai forces in the PRC.
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As far as Thai political perceptions go, the PRC is neither
east nor west. The improvement of political and military
relations with the PRC, the USSR, and Indochina states fits in
well with Thailand's shift toward a more diversified and
independent foreign policy.
The increasing technological sophistication and expense of
western arms has also caused the Thais to seek an alternative
source of arms. Chinese arms sold to Thailand are of simple
design facilitating operation and repair by Thai forces. The
fact that many "high-tech" weapons have not performed as reliably
in wartime as in peacetime conditions and their requirement for
elaborate maintenance not possible in the chaos of war may be one
determinant of why the Thai's are seeking simpler and more easily
maintainable weapon systems. [Ref. 79]
Besides the military hardware that has been given to the
Thai's at no cost, major items of Chinese equipment have been
offered at attractive prices, with longer and more favorable
terms of payment than similar western, particularly U.S.,
equipment. For example, the U.S. M48A5 MBT sells for
approximately US$I million while the Chinese Type-6911 MBT is
being offered for US$300,000. To complement bargain prices,
after-sales service costs are also significantly lower than for
comparable western items of equipment. The Chinese equipment
currently being sold to Thailand also comes as a complete
package. This is in sharp contrast to certain Western arms deals
which have often included the basic systemi with training,
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logistics, and maintenance as separate packages subject to
further negotiation. [Ref. 80]
Service rivalry aside, Thai arms acquisitions must be viewed
by lawmakers through an economically honed prism. PRC
"friendship" prices have proved too inviting for the Thai military
to pass up in light of continued calls for tightened military
budgets. "The longer-term meaning of the arms supply
relationship with the PRC indicates a Thai decision to keep a cap
on its defense budget so as not to inhibit economic growth, while
simultaneously developing a significant regional capability to
control its air and maritime zones as well as its land borders.
[Ref. 81]
The operational performance and adaptability of the Chinese
equipment to the Thai battlefield is another plus. The U.S.
M48A5 has been classified as too heavy for operation in the soft
terrain of much of the Thai/Kampuchean border areas. [Ref. 82]
Weighing in at 48,987kg, the M48A5 is 12,487kg heavier and exerts
from .6-.5 kg/cm2 more of ground pressure than the Chinese Type
6911 [Ref. 83]. (See Appendix M). Senior Thai military sources
have also stated that the Chinese artillery guns (Type 59 130mm)
have longer ranges and are more suitable and capable of reaching
their targets with greater accuracy than U.S. made 155mm
artillery currently in Thai inventories [Ref. 84]. In an 18-day
artillery battle in September-October 1986, the RTA's 130mm
Chinese guns, in concert with U.S. Firefinder anti-artillery
radars, were able to successfully hit four Vietnamese batteries
and caused all eleven in the area to cease firing [Ref. 85].
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Directly related to the above has been the Thai's desire
to rapidly acquire the weapon systems necessary for the
trarsformation of the armed forces from its traditional
counterinsurgency role to a modern, mobile conventional force
capable of defending the country against communist incursions
from the east or from the west, if the events in Burma get messy.
The shift in military doctrine from a focus on counterinsurgency
to a conventional orientation is not unique to Thailand. "The
ASEAN shift from a predominant concern with internal insurgencies
to the establishment of conventional forces with limited power
projection has occurred for several reasons: the atrophy of
communist insurgent groups in the late 1970's; concern about the
capabilities of the Soviet-supported Vietnamese; and the
realization that to defend and exploit 200-mile Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ) requires air and maritime surveillance.
[Ref. 86]
E. PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED SINO-THAI MILITARY RELATIONS
Wlith respect to future participation in Southeast Asia, it is
the PRC that may be in the best strategic position to play a
lasting role. This is due to its geographic proximity, its
traditional consideration of Southeast Asia as a historical
sphere of influence, the quantity and quality of its population,
its special assets in the region such as the overseas Chinese
communities and the national communist parties, and it's past
power remembered and future power anticipated. While the Soviets
and Vietnamese have been labeled by many as the most immediate
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regional threats, it is a united, modernized, and powerful PRC
that to many still constitutes the long-term political and
economic challenge to Southeast Asia. [Ref. 87]
Although Vietnam will more than likely retain the largest
armed force in Southeast Asia over the next 3-5 years, its
withdrawal from Cambodia and improving relations with the PRC,
the U.S. and other Southeast Asian nations will allow it to enact
reductions in current military force levels. Economic conditions
will force Vietnam to reduce its military spending and seek ways
to alter its aggressive image in order to attract Western
investment and other economic assistance. If Vietnamese economic
conditions do not improve and are exacerbated by a withdrawal of
Soviet support, it will face necessary reductions in the quality
and quantity of its armed forces.
Many of the PRC's "strengths" are indeed sources of weakness
mitigating against its return as the region's principal
"suzerian". The overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia still have an
affinity for the homeland of their ancestors but this rarely
translates into a political or ideological attraction that could
be used to the advantage of the communist government in Beijing.
In addition, PRC links to regional communist parties "generates
the suspicion that there may have been only a temporary lull, not
a permanent decline, in PRC-inspired and PRC-supported insurgency
activities in the region. The precept of Chou En-lai that 'When
China speaks, she speaks for Asia' is no longer seriously
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considered valid by the emerging Asian economic and political
powers." [Ref. 88]
Rather than a regional political and economic role model, the
PRC is viewed as an important but not overwhelmingly powerful
regional actor in the increasingly multipolar character of
regional dynamics. It is certainly not the premier strategic
military power in the region and lags even further to the rear
when considering its current economic status and the potential
for internal political upheaval.
In the near term, Sino-Thai military relations can be
expected to expand as Thailand continues the modernization of its
ground, air, and naval forces. W'hile the majority of the
military equipment received to date has been for Thai ground
forces, the RTN and RTAF will undoubtedly seek to purchase
Chinese equipment if offered at the same "friendship" prices,
under equitable payment terms, and with the same short lag time
between order and delivery. The acquisition of increasing
amounts of foreign exchange will enable the Chinese to increase
its acquisition of western arms production technology thereby
improving its product lines with little associated oconomic costs
involved with innovation or research and development. [Pef. 89]
F. SUMMARY
In January 1990, it was reported that Thailand's Cabinet had
finally approved the long-planned project to build a 180
kilometer "land bridge" across the Isthmus of Kra from Krabi on
59
the Andaman Sea to Khanom on the Gulf of Thailand. 1hen
completed, the land bridge will shorten shipping routes through
the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits. As part of the Southern
Seaboard Industrial Project, this effort will also include the
construction of deep sea port facilities, industrial districts, a
transportation network, and undersea gas lines. This project
will be about ten times larger than the Eastern Seaboard
Industrial Project in Rayong Province. [Ref. 90]
The future success of this and other ambitious Thai economic
projects will be partly dependent on the Thai military's
capability to provide a safe climate for foreign investment.
These projects will pose new and unique security requirements for
the Thai military that it has not had to deal with in the past.
This fact seems to indicate two likely outcomes: that the
modernization programs of the Thai armed forces continue and that
the military relationship between the PRC and Thailand will
continue.
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IV. EXPANDING SINO-THAI MILITARY RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR U.S. POLICY
A. OVERLAP OF SINO-U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES
Since the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnamese forces, stated
Chinese and U.S. military assistance objectives in Thailand have
overlapped. Points of overlap have included the desire to reduce
Soviet influence in the region, the removal of Vietnamese forces
and influence from Laos and Cambodia, support to resistance
forces battling Vietnamese and Cambodian-government forces in
Cambodia, achievment of a negotiated settlement to the Cambodian
problem, and the provision of military assistance to the Thai
Armed Forces to assist modernization efforts. (See Appendix N).
In the broad sense, the U.S. has been an active supporter of
closer ties between Thailand and the PRC. The influence and
presence of the PRC provides a counterbalance against Vietnamese
hegemonism in Cambodia and Laos. It also provides a
counterbalance to Soviet naval and air power in East and
Southeast Asia. Although there is considerable anxiety among
some ASEAN states concerning the PRC's true motives in
strengthening ties with Thailand, "The PRC's size and existing
capabilities act as a buffer to Soviet expansion, while its
internal problems and military deficiencies prevent the PRC from
projecting military power throughout the region and adopting an
expansionist policy of its own." [Ref. 91]
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Chinese involvement with Thailand might also enhance the
security of Thailand as U.S. forces and deployment schedules are
realigned due to increasing budget constraints or to meet
challenges in the Persian Gulf and Latin America, as well as
planned escalation in drug enforcement and interdiction
operations. As discussed in some detail above, Chinese arms
exports to Thailand have also contributed significantly to the
rapid modernization of the Thai armed forces to meet its goals of
a transformation from a counterinsurgency orientation to a modern
and capable conventional force.
B. DIFFERENCES OF OPINION.
As with any situation, there are also possible disadvantages
to closer Sino-Thai relations. One of the primary objectives of
U.S. military assistance policies has been to improve Thai
logistic capabilities. This was evident not only by the
logistics MOU worked out in 1987 but also by the proposal and
establishment of the Thai-U.S. War Reserve Stockpile. With the
likelihood of some increase in the acquisition and use of
Chinese-made weapons in the future, significant logistical
problems could occur if Thai combat units employ a mixture of
U.S. and Chinese-made weapons. This could be avoided if certain
units were to use exclusively U.S. weapons while others were
issued Chinese weapons. [Ref. 92]
A second objective of U.S. military assistance, increased
interoperability of Thai and U.S. systems, could also be degraded
by mixing incompatible Chinese or other third party systems in a
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network operating with predominantly U.S. equipment. If the U.S.
and the PRC should at some point seek to decrease diplomatic
contacts or worse, permanently break relations, it is not clear
as to the direction that Thai-PRC or Thai-U.S. relations would
proceed. This will be especially true if U.S. troop withdrawals
occur from the Philippines, Korea and Japan.
C. SUMMARY
Thailand, in recent years, has increasingly sought greater
independence in the formulation of its foreign policies to
include relationships with communist countries ircluding Burma,
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. "The PRC, the U.S., and some ASEAN
countries are concerned that Thailand's economic and political
openings to Indochina will make it easier for Hanoi to retain
control in Cambodia; a policy which could significantly weaken
close relations with the U.S., the PRC, and ASEAN." [Ref. 93]
However this statement is not necessarily true.
Relations between Vietnam and Cambodia have never been very
amicable. In their early southward expansion, the Vietnamese
displaced the Khmers from much of their former territory; perhaps
only the French colonial administration kept the Khmers from
being completely overrun by the expansive Vietnamese. The result
of this continuing conflict has been a tradition of animosity
grounded mainly on Cambodian fear and distrust of all Vietnamese
and any allies who join the Vietnamese in threatening Cambodia.
On the other hand, the Cambodians have not historically trusted
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the Thai but have been closer to the PRC. Prince Sihanouk
remarked in 1961:
Westerners are always astonished that we Cambodians are not
disturbed by our future in which China will play such a
powerful role. But one should try to put himself in our place:
in this jungle, which is the real world, should we, simple
deer, interest ourselves in a dinosaur like China when we are
more directly menaced, and have been for centuries, by the wolf
and the tiger, who are Thailand and Vietnam. [Ref. 94]
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V. CONCLUSION
In an address before the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council
and the Pacific Forum in Honolulu on 21 July 1988, George Shultz
stated:
Thailand has been an ally for over 30 years and today
remains the front-line state resisting Vietnamese aggression
in Cambodia. In turn, America has supported Thailand
diplomatically, militarily, and politically against security
threats. The presence, even as I speak, of U.S. ground,
naval, and air units on bilateral exercises in Thailand
demonstrates that our commitment to Thailand's security
remains firm. [Ref. 95]
Close political and military relationships have continued
since that time and continue today, evidenced by U.S. force
deployments to Thailand for exercises COBRA GOLD and THALAY THAI
during July-September 1989 [Ref. 96.]. Although there have been
and continue to be strains between the U.S. and Thailand
regarding decreased levels of economic aid and security
assistance, Thai policies toward Vietnamese refugees, Thai
contacts with Indochinese communist states, and numerous trade
issues, there is little reason to believe that closer Sino-Thai
military relations alone will prove detrimental to historically
close U.S.-Thai military relationships. However in the broad
context of U.S.-Southeast Asian policies and resulting strategic
political and military relations with the PRC, with Thailand, and
with the member nations of ASEAN, the expanding Sino-Thai
military relationship and its possible long term impact on
regional stability should continue to be closely monitored.
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In the future. it can be anticipated that Bangkok will be
searching for some clearer indication of U.S. interests and
intentions in the region. Of particular interest to the Thai's
will be the status of the U.S. commitment embodied in the Manila
Pact and the Rusk-Thanat Communique, the future of U.S. security
presence in the region, and the prospect for continued U.S.
economic aid and security assistance. What is increasingly clear
to Bangkok and many other regional capitals is the realization
that any alliance existing or made in the rapid course of change
occurring in the world today will remain valid only so long as
the national interests of the concerned parties remain unchanged
politically, militarily, and economically.
An increasingly prominent topic evident in conference papers
of noted Thai academics and former government officials, articles
and editorials of Thai newspapers found in FBIS materials, and
statements of Thai government officials, is that a U.S. military
response to a regional threat to Thailand can more than likely be
expected only if it is compatible with current U.S. interests,
not those that existed when the security agreements were signed.
In spite of Thai concerns, this would be the most responsible
course of action for the U.S..
Thailand's "omnidirectional" trend in foreign policy
relations with the two communist superpowers as well as regional
communist governments may be d partial reflection and grudging
admission of its belief that, in spite of ste tements made by
every U.S. President to the contrary, its closest western ally
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may not be prepared to go beyond diplomacy if the external or
internal security of Thailand were threatened. Future Thai
security will and should be dependent on more independent and
autonomous policy decisions for itself with respect to regional
as well as international actors. Working toward and
participating in an atmosphere of regional, mutually beneficial
interdependence through improved state-state, government-
government, and people-people relationships may well be the best
way for Thailand to further its own national interests and
guarantee a place for itself as the true political and economic
SuwanAphumbe (Golden Peninsula) throughout the next decade.
I am sure Lord Palmerston would agree.
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MAJOR MILITARY SUPPLIERS TO THAILAND, 1964-1988


























1. Percentage of PRC arms sales to Thailand had risen
substantially in light of Thai purchases in 1987-89.
2. Other military suppliers to Thailand include
Australia, Belgium, Isrdel, the ROK, and Singapore
Sources: "Military Dependency: Thailand and the
Philippines," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 25,
No. 4 (1988), p. 436; World Military Expenditures
and Arms Transfers 19HTp. 112.
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EXCERPTS FROM THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY
(MANILA PACT), 8 SEPTEMBER 1954
The Parties to this Treaty (Australia, France, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom,
the United States),
Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,
Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set
forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to
live in peace with all peoples and all governments,
Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will
earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-
government and to secure the independence of all countries whose
peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,
Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to
uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the
rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and
development of all peoples in the treaty area,
Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of
unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the
Parties stand together in the area, and
Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective
defense for the preservation of peace and security,
Therefore agree as follows:
Article IV. 1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by
means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the
Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by
unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its
own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act
to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council of the United
Nations.
2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the
inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the
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sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty
area or of any other State or territory to which provisions of
paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened
in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or
threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the
peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order
to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common
defense.
3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any
State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph I of this
Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except
at the invitation or with the consent of the government
concerned.
Article VIII. As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is
the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire
territories of the Asian Parties, and the general areas of the
Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21
degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous
agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area
the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance
with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.
Article X. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely,
but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice
of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines, which shall inform the governments of the
other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.
Understanding of the United States of America
The United States of America in executing the present Treaty
does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect
of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference
thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist
aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or
armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV,
paragraph 2.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have
signed this Treaty.
Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.
Source: Maki, John M. Conflict and Tension in the Far East: Key
Documents 1894-1960, (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
T -61 pp. 228-231.
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APPENDIX E
TEXT OF RUSK-THANAT COMMUNIQUE, 6 MARCH 1962
U.S. Department of State Press Release 145 dated March 6, 1962
The Foreign Minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, and the
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, met on several occasions during
the past few days for discussions on the current situation in
Southeast Asia, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and
the Security of Thailand.
The Secretary of State reaffirmed that the United States
regards the preservation of the independence and integrity of
Thailand as vital to the national interest of the United States
and to world peace. He expressed the firm intention of the
United States to aid Thailand, its ally and historic friend, in
resisting Communist aggression and subversion.
The Foreign Minister and Secretary of State reviewed the
close association of Thailand and the United States in the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and agreed that such
association is an effective deterrent to direct Communist
aggression against Thailand. They agreed that the Treaty
provides the basis for the signatories collectively to assist
Thailand in case of Communist armed attack against that country.
The Secretary of State assured the Foreign Minister that in the
event of such aggression, the United States intends to give full
effect to its obligations under the Treaty to act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
The Secretary of State reaffirmed that this obligation of the
United States does not depend upon the prior agreement of all
other parties to the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is
individual as well as collective.
In reviewing measures to meet indirect aggression, the
Secretary of State stated that the United States regards its
commitments to Thailand under the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty and under its bilateral economic and military
assistance agreements with Thailand as providing an important
basis for United States actions to help Thailand meet indirect
aggression. In this connection the Secretary reviewed with the
Foreign Minister the actions being taken by the United States to
assist the Republic of Vietnam to meet the threat of indirect
aggression.
The Foreign Minister assured the Secretary of State of the
determination of the Government of Thailand to meet the threat of
indirect aggression by pursuing vigorously measures for the
economic and social welfare and the safety of its people.
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The situation in Laos was reviewed in detail and full
agreement was reached on the necessity for the stability of
Southeast Asia, of achieving a free. independent and truly
neutral Laos.
The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State reviewed the
mutual efforts of their governments to increase the capabilities
and readiness of the thai armed forced to defend the Kingdom.
They noted also that the United States is making a significant
contribution to this effort and that the United States intends to
accelerate future deliveries to the greatest extent possible.
The Secretary and the Foreign Minister also took note of the
work of the Joint Thai-United States Committee which has been
established in Bangkok to assure effective cooperation in social,
economic, and military measures to increase Thailand's national
capabilities. They agreed that this Joint Committee and its
subcommittees should continue to work toward the most effective
utilization of Thailand's resources and those provided by the
United States to promote Thailand's development and security.
The Foreign Minister and the Secretary were in full agreement
that continued economic and social progress is essential to the
stability of Thailand. They reviewed Thailand's impressive
economic and social progress and the Thai Government's plans to
accelerate development, particularly Thailand's continuing
determination fully to utilize its own resources in moving toward
its development goals.
The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State also
discussed the desirability of an early conclusion of a treaty of
friendship, commerce and navigation between the two countries
which would bring into accord with current conditions the
exisLing treaty of 1937.
Source: Department of State Bulletin, "The Realities of Foreign
Policy, n remarks by Secretary Rusk, Vol. XLVI, No. 1187
(March 26, 1962). pp. 498-499.
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APPENDIX F
EXCERPTS FROM UNOFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S MEETING
WITH REPORTERS, GUAM OFFICERS CLUB, 25 JULY 1969
The United States is going to be facing, [Nixon] hoped before
too long-no one can say how long, but before too long-a major
decision. What will be its role in Asia and in the Pacific after
the end of the war in Vietnam? We will be facing that decision,
but also the Asian nations will be wondering about what that
decision is, Mr. Nixon said.
When [Nixon] talked to Prime Minister John G. Gorton, for
example, he indicated that in the conversations that he had with
a number of Asian leaders, they all wondered whether the United
States, because of its frustration over the war in Vietnam,
because of its earlier frustration over the war in Korea, whether
the United States would continue to play a significant role in
Asia or whether the United States, like the French before, and
then the British, and, of course, the Dutch-whether it would
withdraw from the Pacific and play a minor role.
Mr. Nixon said he thinks that one of the weaknesses in
American foreign policy is that too often we react rather
precipitously to events as they occur. We fail to have the
perspective and the long range view that is essential for a
policy that will be viable.
As we look at Asia today, the President obs,'.ved, we see that
the major world power that adopts a very aggressive attitude and
a belligerent attitude in its foreign policy, Communist China, of
course, is in Asia, and we find that the two minor world powers-
minor, although they do have significant strength as we have
learned-that most greatly threaten the peace of the world, that
adopt the most belligerent foreign policy, are in Asia-North
Korea and, of course, North Vietnam.
When we consider those factors, we realize that if we are
thinking down the road-not just four or five years, but 10, 15 or
20-that if we are going to have peace in the world, that
potentially the greatest threat to that peace will be in the
Pacific, the President said.
The President was asked, on the question of United States
military relationships in Asia, a hypothetical question: If a
leader of one of the countries with which we have had close
military relationships, either through SEATO or in Vietnam,
should say, "Well, you are pulling out of Vietnam with your
troops. We can read the newspapers. How can we know you will
remain to play a significant role as you say you wish to do in
the security arrangements in Europe? " What kind of approach
would [Nixon] take to that question?
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The President replied that he had indicated that the answer
to that question was not an easy one-not easy because we would be
greatly tempted when that question is put to us to indicate that
if any nation desires the assistance of the United States
militarily in order to meet an internal or external threat we
will provide it.
However, he said he believed that the time had come when the
United States, in its relations with all of its Asian friends,
should be quite emphatic on two points: one, that we would keep
our treaty commitments; our treaty commitments, for example, with
Thailand under SEATO. And two, that as far as the problems of
international security are concerned, as far as the problems of
military defense, except for the threat of a major power
involving nuclear weapons, that the United States was going to
encourage and had a right to expect that this problem would be
increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by,
the Asian nations themselves.
The President was asked whether he anticipates in that
connection during his talks with the Asian leaders he is going to
have to spend any significant amount of time perhaps convincing
them that his plan for withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam
will pose no threat to their security.
The President replied that one of the reasons for this trip
is to leave no doubt in the minds of the leaders of non-Communist
Asia that the United States is committed to a policy in the
Pacific-a policy not of intervention but one that certainly rules
out withdrawal, and regardless of what happens in Vietnam that we
intend to continue to play a role in Asia to the extent that
Asian nations, bilaterally and collectively, desire us to play a
role.
The President said he could put it this way: he recalled in
1964 some advice that he got from Mohammed Ayub Khan, who was
then the President of Pakistan. This was before the United
States had any significant troop commitment in Vietnam. Mr.
Nixon asked him what his view was as to what our role should be.
He said: "Well, the role of the United States in Vietnam or the
Philippines, or Thailand, or any of these countries which have
internal subversion is to help them fight the war but not fight
the war for them." That, of course, is a good general principle,
one which we would hope would be our policy generally throughout
the world, the President said.
We of course have the SEATO Treaty. We will keep our
commitments under that treaty. We had the Rusk-Thanat
communique, which simply spelled out the treaty. We will, of




EXCERPT FROM PRESIDENT NIXON'S "THE PURSUIT OF PEACE IN
VIETNAM", TELEVISION AND RADIO ADDRESS, NOVEMBER 3, 1969
New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy
Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on
another front.
At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we
might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through
negotiations.
I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace-a
plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what
happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with a major
shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press
conference at Guam on July 25.
Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon
doctrine-a policy which not only will help end the war in Viet-
Nam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent
future Viet-Nams.
We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an
impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job,
we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over
into our foreign policy.
In Korea and again in Viet-Nam, the United States furnished
most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help
the people of those countries defend titir freedom against
Communist aggression.
Before any American troops were committed to Viet-Nam, a
leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when
I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: "When you
are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S.
policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the
war for them."
Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in
Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy
toward Asia:
-First, the United States will keep all of its treaty
commitments.
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-Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power
threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation
whose survival we consider vital to our security.
-Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we
shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in
accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the
nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility
of pro :ng the manpower for its defenses.
After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of
the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other
nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression
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APPENDIX J
MAJOR THAI ARMS ARRANGEMENTS WITH U.S.-PRC (1985-1989)
KEY
Weapon/Weapon System Status
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery CA Contract Announced
APC Armored Personnel Carrier CR Contract Reported
Arty Artillery CS Contract Signed
Helo Helicopter DE Delivered, Delivery
Begun





SOURCE WEAPON/WEAPON SYSTEM QUANTITY STATUS
PRC F-7 Aircraft (Recce) RN (84)
U.S. SANDERS Low Altitude OD (Feb 85)
Detection System
U.S. Unspecified APC/Arty DE (Mar 85)
PRC Model 59 MBT 24 RD (Mar 85)
PRC 37 MM AAA 12 RD (Mar 85)
PRC Type 59 130mm Artillery 18 RD (Mar 85)
U.S. F-16 Aircraft 12 OD (Apr 85)
U.S. S-2 Aircraft 18-20 CR (May 85)
U.S. AN/TPQ 37 Radar 2 OD (Jun 85)
U.S. AN/TPS 70 1 RN (Jun 85)
U.S. HUD for F-5E/F Aircraft 39 OD (Apr 86)
U.S. AH-1 TOW Helicopters 4 OD (Jul 86)
U.S. M998 Vehicles 150 CR (Oct 86)
U.S. F-16 AN/APG 66 Radar CA (Feb 87)
U.S. Missile Corvette 1 DE (Feb 87)
PRC Type 6911 MBT 30 CR (Mar 87)
U.S. M48A5 MBT OD (May 87)
PRC YW-531H APC 400 CS (May 87)
PRC 37mm AAA 30 CA (May 87)
PRC 57 mm AAA 25 OD (May 87)
PRC ARV 653 16 OD (%dy 87)
PRC Model 84 Bridgelayers 4 OD (May 87)
U.S. F-16 Aircraft 6 OD (Jul 87)
U.S. Learjet 34A 3 CR (Aug 87)
U.S. Com,,ando Stingray LT 106 CR (Oct 87)
U.S. M44A2 2 1/2 ton Trucks 188 CR (Dec 87)
1/2 ton Trucks 161
86
PRC 130 MM Ammunition CA (Apr 88)
PRC Minesweepers 9 CA (Apr 88)
PRC SAM HN-5 Missile CA (Apr 88)
Guidance System
PRC Radar Guidance System CA (Apr 88)
PRC YW-531H APC 360 OD (Apr 88)
PRC Type 59 130mm Arty 38 OD (Apr 88)
PRC Type 6911 MBT 23 OD (May 88)
U.S. 414-100 Chinook Helo, 3 OD (Aug 88)
Spare Parts
PRC Frigates 4 CR (Sep 88)
PRC P74 AAA 4 OD (Sep 88)
U.S. F-5E Aircraft 10 OD (Oct 88)
PRC Type 63Mk2 APC 400 OD (Nov 88)
PRC Type 6911 MBT 30 OD (Nov 88)
PRC 37mm AAA 24 DE (Nov 88)
PRC Tracked APC 300 DE (Nov 88)
PRC Type 69 MBT 30 DE (Nov 88)
U.S. TH-300C Helo, 12 DE (Feb 89)
Spare Parts, Support
U.S. CGT Stingray LT 106 DE (Jun 89)
U.S. M48A5 40 OD (Jun 89)
PRC Type 6911 MBT 53 OD (Jun 89)
PRC YW-531 APC 410 OD (Jun 89)
PRC T63Mk2 APC 360 OD (Jun 89)
PRC Frigates 2 OD (Oct 89)
PRC Ammunition 57mm, 100mm CS (Jul 90)
13mm
U.S. M48A5/M6OA1 MBT 350/160 RN (Jul 90)
U.S. LH-IN 10 CS (Jul 90)
U.S. AH-1F 4 OD (Jul 90)
(Note: Compiled from multiple editions of Defense and Foreign
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APPENDIX M
COMPARISON OF MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES
OF MAIN BATTLE TANKS (MBT)- US M48A5 VS. PRC TYPE 6911
CHARACTERISTICS M48A5 TYPE 6911 ADVANTAGE
Fire Power:
Main Gun(mm) 105 100/105 US/Parity
Stored Load 54 40 US
Loading Process Manual Manual Parity





Day Direct View Direct View Parity
Night Active Infra Active Infra Parity
Red Red
Survivability:
Armor Protection Homogenous Homogenous Parity
Steel Steel
Front Turret(mm) 110 203 PRC
Hull Front(mm) 120 97 US
NBC Protection Individual Individual Parity
Mobility:
Engine(hp) Diesel, 750 Diesel, 580 US
Transmission Auto, 2F, IR
Weight(kg) 48,987 37,000 PRC
Power to Weight
Ratio(hp/tonne) 15.89 15.89 Parity
Max Range(km) 500 420-440 US
Road Speed(kph) 48 50 PRC
Sources: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign
Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1986-87
art ~ -99th-Congress, 1st Session, 1986, p.
441; "Chinese Type 69 II MBT-Details Revealed,"




COMPARISON OF STATED U.S./PRC SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES
U.S. Security Assistance Objectives:
1. Support (military) acquisitions to enhance capabilities
for defense against major Vietnamese infantry, artillery, and
armor incursions and other aggression
2. Encourage enhanced tactical mobility for ground forces and
sustainability in combat for all forces
3. Encourage expansion of Naval capabilities beyond coastal
4. Create an air defense system composed of radar integrated
with C3 that is interoperable with U.S. systems
5. Help sustain the ability of the Thai government to carry
out policies toward Indochinese refugees.(58)
The PRC's "Three Principles of Arms Sales":
1. Strengthening of legitimate self-defense capabilities of
the countries concerned
2. The safeguarding and promotion of peace, security, and
stability in the region
3. The avoidance of the use of military sales as a means of
interference in the internal affairs of other nations.(59)
Sources: U.S. Congress, Senate. Conqressional Presentation for
Security Assistance Programs FY-89, (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1988T, p. 346; Eden Y. Woon,7"Chinese Arms Sales
and U.S.-China Military Relations," Asia Survey, Vol.
29, No. 6 (June 1989), p. 610.
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